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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PRESERVATION LETTERS AND FOURTH AMENDMENT
SEIZURES: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR KERR
MICHAEL L. LEVY*
ABSTRACT
The Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.) requires an
Internet Service Provider to preserve the contents of a user account upon
receiving a request from a government agency. The maximum period of
preservation is 180 days. However, the government agency cannot get access to
the copy, unless it presents proper legal process, usually a search warrant.
During this time, the user has complete access to their account. In a recent
article, Professor Orin Kerr has advanced a thesis that copying pursuant to the
government’s preservation requests under the Stored Communications Act is a
Fourth Amendment seizure. This Article disputes Professor Kerr’s argument. It
does so on his terms, that digital copying is a meaningful interference with a
possessory interest in property, but also advances a new theory of seizure in the
digital world. This theory is premised on the idea that unlike physical seizures,
which interfere with a possessor’s access to the tangible objects seized, digital
copying does not. The real concern with digital copying is the privacy of the
data. Although privacy is usually the concern of the law of searches, this Article
advances the idea that when we analyze the concept of seizure with respect to
the copying of digital evidence, it is the owner’s privacy interest in the data, and
not their access to it, that we need to address. Viewed from a privacy
perspective, preservation requests are not seizures.

* Mr. Levy is an adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School.
He was an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for thirty-seven years
and served as the Chief of Computer Crimes before retiring in 2019. He twice served as interim
U.S. Attorney. The author thanks Assistant U.S. Attorneys Paul Shapiro, Albert Glenn, and Robert
Livermore from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Josh Goldfoot and Nathan Judish from the
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the U.S. Department of Justice, Professor
David Rudovsky, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, and Professor Orin Kerr,
University of California, Berkeley Law School for their helpful comments and suggestions during
the drafting of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
In a recently published article, 1 Professor Orin Kerr expands upon his theory
of Fourth Amendment seizure in the digital world that he advanced in Fourth
Amendment Seizures of Computer Data. 2 In 2010, Professor Kerr examined
cases involving the copying of data and concluded that they were seizures, even
though in the physical world sense, the act of copying did not seem to result in
a “meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that
property.” 3 In his new article, Professor Kerr develops an idea that he advanced
in 2010the Stored Communications Act section that permits the government
to require an Internet Service Provider to preserve a copy of a suspect’s account
is a seizure, 4 even though the government cannot get access to the contents of
this copy. 5 In this Article, the author suggests that Professor Kerr is mistaken, 6
doing so by two methods. First, taking Professor Kerr’s use of the traditional
definition of seizure to cover digital copying, the author argues that a
preservation letter does not act as a seizure. Second, the author suggests that
Kerr’s two articles are premised on a view of seizure of data that is wrong. Kerr’s
definition of seizure of data looks to the physical world cases. 7 However, the
concerns about physical world seizures are about access to and control of
objects. 8 This author suggests that the concerns about copying of data are not
about access and control but are about privacythe usual concern of search law,
not seizure law. Once we acknowledge that, we can develop a more coherent
view of digital seizures. Using such an analysis, a preservation letter is not a
seizure.
This Article has several parts. Part I discusses Professor Kerr’s theory of
seizure. The second part will propose a different way of analyzing digital
copying, based upon what the author suggests is the real concernprivacy and
not possession. Part II further explains the thesis: our concern with digital
copying is not with the deprivation of a possessory interest in the data, but in the
privacy interest. The author suggests that this way of approaching the problem
does a better job of explaining why photographing a scene is not a seizure and
why copying by a government router on the Internet is not a seizure. Professor
Kerr’s 2010 article creates ad hoc exceptions for these two types of copying
1. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment Limits of Internet Content Preservation, 65 ST.
LOUIS L.J. 753 (2021) [hereinafter Kerr 2021].
2. Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures of Computer Data, 119 YALE L.J. 700 (2010)
[hereinafter Kerr 2010].
3. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f).
5. Kerr 2021, supra note 1.
6. As someone who has read Professor Kerr’s writings frequently, and who uses his textbook
to teach, this author writes this with much trepidation.
7. Kerr 2021, supra note 1.
8. Id.
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because under the traditional definition, they are seizures. The theory advanced
here requires no special adjustments. Part III summarizes the workings of
Section 2703 and the preservation section, subsection 2703(f). Part IV discusses
Professor Kerr’s position that a preservation letter is a seizure and shows that
whether employing the traditional view or a privacy view of seizure, a
preservation letter is not a seizure. Finally, Part V discusses the only type of data
subject to suppression under Professor Kerr’s theory—data that a user sought to
delete after the provider copied the account pursuant to the preservation letter.
This discussion applies both the physical seizure analysis employed by Professor
Kerr and the privacy analysis advanced in Part II to argue that no seizure occurs.
The idea implicit in Professor Kerr’s argument is that there is a right to delete,
and this author argues that there is no such right. 9
I. PROFESSOR KERR’S POSITION THAT PRESERVATION IS A SEIZURE
The problem of conceptualizing digital seizures is best illustrated by the case
of United States v. Gorshkov. 10 The FBI had identified Gorshkov as a Russian
hacker who had gained access to American businesses, then set up an undercover
business and invited Gorshkov to the United States under the pretext of retaining
him for computer security. 11 Gorshkov flew to Seattle, where the FBI agents
took him to the office of the undercover business and provided him with a
computer so he could demonstrate his skills. 12 He used the computer to log into
his account in Russia, downloaded some of his hacker tools, and demonstrated
his skills. 13 As he left, the agents arrested him. 14 The agents had installed a
keylogger on the computer they had given to him. 15 They obtained his password
from the keylogger, logged into his Russian Internet account, and downloaded
the contents. 16 The FBI did not obtain a warrant until after they had obtained the
contents. 17 Gorshkov’s motion to suppress was denied, in part because the court
found that making a copy of his account
[W]as not a seizure under the Fourth Amendment because it did not interfere
with Defendant’s or anyone else’s possessory interest in the data. The data
remained intact and unaltered. It remained accessible to Defendant and any co-

9. Kerr 2021, supra note 1.
10. United States v. Gorshkov, No. CR00-550C, 2001 WL 1024026 (W.D. Wash. May 23,
2001).
11. Id. at *1.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. United States v. Gorshkov, No. CR00-550C, 2001 WL 1024026, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May
23, 2001).
16. Id.
17. Id. at *1–2.
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conspirators or partners with whom he had shared access. The copying of the
data had absolutely no impact on his possessory rights. 18

This definition of seizure comes from United States v. Jacobsen. 19 The result in
Gorshkov was a straightforward application of Jacobsen. As such, it is correct.
However, it feels intuitively wrong. How can a law enforcement agency obtain
a copy of a person’s data—that it did not have before—and not have seized it?
A more sophisticated effort to wrestle with the issue can be found in United
States v. Jefferson. 20 There, FBI agents executing a search warrant viewed
certain records that they chose not to seize. 21 The agents believed that they could
take these documents under the plain view doctrine, 22 but following the
directions of the Assistant U.S. Attorneys, opted to take high resolution
photographs of thirteen documents or to make handwritten notes based upon
their review. 23 At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the government conceded
that two of the documents were not within the scope of the warrant and could
not be seized. 24 The court ruled that the other documents could have been taken
under the plain view doctrine. 25 To reach that conclusion, the court first had to
decide if taking high resolution photographs or making notes constituted a
seizure of the documents. 26 Making a deeper analysis of what it means to “seize”
an intangible, 27 the court referenced Hoffa v. United States, 28 Katz v. United
States, 29 and United States v. New York Telephone Co. 30 for the proposition that
intangibles, such as words and electronic signals, could be “seized” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Although Arizona v. Hicks held that copying
of a serial number on a piece of equipment was not a seizure, 31 the court found
that Hoffa, Katz, and New York Telephone Co. were more pertinent to the
problem. Thus, the court held that photographing a document and taking notes
about a document’s contents were seizures, 32 and explained that these cases
[R]ecognize that the Fourth Amendment privacy interest extends not just to the
paper on which the information is written or the disc on which it is recorded but
18. Id. at *3.
19. 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful
interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.”).
20. United States v. Jefferson, 571 F. Supp. 2d 696 (E.D. Va. 2008).
21. Id. at 699–700.
22. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 131 (1990).
23. Jefferson, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 700.
24. Id. at 711.
25. United States v. Jefferson, 571 F. Supp. 2d 696, 711 (E.D. Va. 2008).
26. Id. at 701.
27. Id.
28. 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966).
29. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
30. 434 U.S. 159, 169 (1977).
31. 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987).
32. United States v. Jefferson, 571 F. Supp. 2d 696, 704 (E.D. Va. 2008).
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also to the information on the paper or disc itself. It follows from this that
recording the information by photograph or otherwise interferes with this
possessory privacy interest even if the document or disc is not itself seized. 33

The court expressed a critical insight—the central principle of this Article:
In other words, while copying the contents of a person’s documents by way of
photographs or written notes does not interfere with a person’s possession of
those documents, it does interfere with the person’s sole possession of the
information contained in those documents: it diminishes the person’s privacy
value in that information. 34

Judge Ellis had it right in Jefferson. When the drafters of the Fourth
Amendment wrote about “papers and effects,” they were not concerned about
blank sheets of foolscap. 35 They were concerned about what they had written to
one another on those sheets. 36 It was the privacy of the content that mattered to
them. 37 In twentieth and twenty-first century terms, it is not the possessory
interest in papers that is the concern, it is the privacy interest.
In his 2010 article, Professor Kerr proposed that such copying was a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment, writing:
In my view, the most consistent way to apply the Fourth Amendment seizure
doctrine to computer data is to hold that electronic copying ordinarily seizes it
under the Fourth Amendment. When the government makes an electronic copy
of data, it obtains possession of the data that it can preserve for future use. To
be sure, subsequently viewing the data in the copy and thus exposing its contents
ordinarily amounts to a Fourth Amendment search. But obtaining the copy itself
serves the traditional function regulated by the seizure power: it freezes
whatever information is copied, preserving it for future access by government
investigators. Generating an electronic copy of data freezes that data for future
use just like taking physical property freezes it. 38

Professor Kerr then had to deal with two anomalies created by his
application of the traditional physical world definition to digital copying. The
first was copying what the agents could already see. In Hicks, the agents looked
at a stereo and copied down the serial number. 39 The Supreme Court held that

33. Id. at 702.
34. Id. at 703.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625–39 (1886).
37. Id. at 630 (“Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of
aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony, or of his private
papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his goods, is within the
condemnation of that judgment.”).
38. Kerr 2010, supra note 2, at 711–12.
39. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 321 (1987).
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writing down the serial number was not a seizure. 40 In Bills v. Aseltine, 41 the
agents took photos of a search scene. The Sixth Circuit held that this was not a
seizure. 42 These were common sense decisions, but if one said that copying
information is a seizure, these cases would seem to be seizures. Professor Kerr’s
solution was to divide copying, which was an aid to the memory of the agent,
recording what law enforcement had already seen as in Hicks and Bills, from
copying without seeing the data, for the purpose of freezing it. 43 Digital copying
is freezing and not an aid to memory. 44 Therefore, digital copying is a seizure;
writing down or photographing what the agent had already seen is not. 45
The other anomaly was the actions of government routers on the Internet.
Routers on the Internet copy the data that they receive and send it on. 46 They
retain it for short periods in case the routers downstream did not receive the
communication. 47 Professor Kerr noted that such copying did not interrupt the
usual course of transmission. 48 He compared the Internet router to detained
packages, noting that when a package is detained in transit, the government’s
action interferes with the course of transmission, but the copying by the Internet
router did not. 49
The strict application of Professor Kerr’s theory would prohibit law
enforcement officers from taking photos of crime scenes, photos of their
execution of search warrants, copying serial numbers, and the actions of
government routers on the Internet. To avoid these untoward results, Professor
Kerr created ad hoc distinctions for cases which either made no sense (Hicks and
Bills), or which would effectively require rethinking having government routers
on the Internet. 50 These are, however, “fudge factors”ad hoc rules to render
certain acts of copying not seizures—and do not arise from the definition of
seizure. It was not that taking photos of a search scene or the use of government
routers on the Internet did not fit the definition of seizure; it was that calling
them seizures felt ludicrous. This solution is reminiscent of the efforts to
preserve the geocentric view of the universe as evidence grew that the earth
circled the sun and not vice versa. Scientists created concepts, such as

40. Id.
41. 958 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 1992).
42. Id. at 707.
43. Kerr 2010, supra note 2, at 717.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Network Fundamentals—Switches, LANs, Routers, and Other Networking Devices, UNIV.
HOUS. (2022), https://www.uhcl.edu/information-security/tips-best-practices/routers [https://per
ma.cc/RA62-AU8X].
47. Id.
48. Kerr 2021, supra note 1, at 787–88.
49. Kerr 2010, supra note 2, at 720–24.
50. Id. at 714–15.
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epicycles, 51 to explain the evidence, but it only made the system more
complicated. Creating ad hoc exceptionsfudge factorsdoes not make for a
consistent body of law.
II. A PRIVACY APPROACH TO SEIZURES OF DATA
A.

The Theoretical Framework

A better solution to the problem of copying is to examine the underlying
concerns about physical seizures versus data copying, because they are different.
These differences should prompt a reexamination of what constitutes a seizure
in the digital world. What troubles us about government copying of data is not
the owner’s possessory interest in the data. We are not concerned that the
government will sell the data or otherwise make economic use it. That may be
the concern of the copyright holder, but it is not the concern of the average
person over the contents of their e-mail, Facebook messages, or Dropbox
account. Nor are we concerned that the owner has lost access to the data. What
concerns us is the privacy interest. If the government has a copy of the data, it
can search it. While the government did not search Gorshkov’s data until after
it obtained a warrant, there was the potential for a warrantless search. 52 It is this
privacy concern that makes Gorshkov feel wrong. 53 Similarly, we feel that the
court got the concept right in Jefferson when it recognized that making a perfect
copy of a document should be a seizure, even if the police leave the physical
paper behind when they depart. 54 As the court in Jefferson said, the concern is
not with the possession of the document, the concern with copying is that “it
diminishes the person’s privacy value in that information.” 55
The concern with physical world seizures is different. If the police seize one
of your possessions, they have it; you do not. You are unable to make any use
of the physical property. 56 When the police copy data, whether it is copying a
computer hard drive or having an Internet Service Provider make a copy, there
is no meaningful interference with the use of property. Our concern is with the
police looking at it.
51. See Alexander Raymond Jones, Ptolemaic System, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (May 19, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/science/Ptolemaic-system [https://perma.cc/2CAK-DL7W].
52. United States v. Gorshkov, No. CR00-550C, 2001 WL 1024026, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May
23, 2001).
53. Id. at *1–2.
54. United States v. Jefferson, 571 F. Supp. 2d 696, 703 (E.D. Va. 2008).
55. Id. at 702.
56. When the police seize a container (i.e., suitcase, backpack, cell phone, computer) the
concern is both with the possessory interest in the property and the privacy interest in what is in it.
Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the seizure of Riley’s telephone was proper because it was taken
incident to arrest. It was the privacy concerns that led the Court to require a warrant to copy and
search the data inside it. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
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Kerr argues for the traditional definition of seizure, but with digital data, he
focuses on exclusivity of possession when stating: “The question is, should the
law focus on when a person loses exclusive rights to the device, or when a person
loses exclusive rights to the data? The law should focus on when the person loses
exclusive rights to the data.” 57 However, the concern about someone else having
a copy of our data is not like that of a copyright holder, concerned that the
wrongful possessor will make money from it. Our concern about exclusivity of
possession is, at its heart, a concern about our privacy in the data. We alone
should determine who gets to see our data. Absent some good reason (for
example, probable cause), we should determine whether the government can get
to see it.
For this reason, we need to recast what is a seizure of data. This author
proposes the following:
A digital seizure occurs when the government copies data (whether it exists in
electronic or physical format) for the purpose of letting a law enforcement
officer view the data, which the law enforcement officer has not previously been
able to view, if the law enforcement officer has ready access to the data as a
result of the copying. 58

When the officer has already been able to view the data, the privacy interest
was lost before the copying. Thus, copying the serial number, in Hicks, 59 or
taking a photo of a search scene, in Bills, 60 were not seizures because the police
had invaded the privacy interest before they made the copy. The same definition
takes care of the government router on the Internet. The router does not copy the
data for any human to see. For that reason, the copying by the router is not a
seizure. 61
For the most part, the definition proposed here and Professor Kerr’s reach
similar results. The copying of Gorshkov’s account would be a seizure under
either test. Those documents that the agents perused in Jefferson and then
photographed or described in notes would not have been seized because they
had already reviewed them. If the warrant covered those items, or if they could
be properly seized under the plain view doctrine, any seizure (physically or
digitally) would be proper. On the other hand, if the agents in Jefferson had
photographed documents without reading them, their actions would have been a
seizure.

57. Kerr 2010, supra note 2, at 712.
58. Viewing includes any form of human perceptionsight, hearing, etc. Taste, smell, and
touch are not yet realities on the Internet, but who knows what will be available in twenty years.
59. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987).
60. Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 1992).
61. This is the old conundrum whether a tree falling in the forest makes a sound if no one
hears it. In this case, the author suggests that the answer is that if no one hears it, or will hear it,
nothing has been seized.
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The Jefferson case does raise a problem that was not involved in its facts.
Suppose the agents had looked at a document, concluded it was not within the
scope of the warrant or the plain view exception, but photographed it anyway.
Did the agents’ review of the document remove the privacy right, and does that
mean that the photographing is not a seizure? Although the answer is not clear,
this author suggests that such copying would not be proper because the original,
permissible invasion of the privacy right was very limited. In searching for paper
(or digital) files, the law only permits a cursory review to determine if the
document is within the scope of the warrant. 62 Although this causes some loss
of privacy, the loss is only sufficient to determine if the document is within the
scope of the warrant. If a quick scan shows that it is not, the agent must stop
reading and move on. Making a copy under these circumstances is a much larger
invasion of privacy than permitted by the search authority. The agents should be
permitted to make notes that are consistent with what they permissibly saw. For
example, during a home office search in the investigation of a fraud case, the
agent could note that she came across a copy of the subject’s will. The
preservation here would match the permissible invasion of privacy and no more.
A detailed description of what the subject had bequeathed and to whom would
not be proper, unless the agent could seize the will under the warrant. That
copying would be a greater invasion of privacy than the law permitted.
Both Kerr’s rule and this one also resolve the question of what part of the
Fourth Amendment was implicated when the Supreme Court wrote in Katz,
“[t]he Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” 63 The Court never said whether it was a
search or a seizure. 64 Using either test, copying the words spoken by Katz inside
the telephone booth was done to hear words the government had not heard
before. 65 Under Professor Kerr’s test, this was to freeze Katz’s words. 66 Under
the test proposed above, it is a seizure because the government had no access to
Katz’s words before the event in question. Using the traditional concept of
seizure as Professor Kerr does, the recording of Katz’s voice might also have
been a seizure because the government had an unauthorized exemplar of Katz’s
voice—an asset it did not have before. However, we all know that it was not the
62. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976) (“In searches for papers, it is certain
that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether
they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized.”); United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d
511, 519–20 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying the principle to computer searches); United States v. Stabile,
633 F.3d 219, 234 (3d Cir. 2011) (same).
63. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
64. See id.
65. Id. at 354.
66. Kerr 2010, supra note 2, at 708.
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sound of Katz’s voice, but the content of his words that mattered. That was a
privacy concern, not a property concern.
Similarly, under both tests, the making of a consensual recording of a
conversation is not a seizure. To Professor Kerr, the recording is an aid to
memory. 67 Under the proposed test, the government was entitled to perceive and
did perceive the conversation as it was happening.
The proposed test has a parallel to the test in United States v. Jones, where
the Court held that there was a search when the government “physically
occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.” 68 Here,
under the proposed test, we can say that there is a seizure when the government
makes a copy for the purpose of obtaining information. If it already has the
information, the copying is not a seizure because the government has already
obtained the information. If the purpose of the copying is not to obtain
information for human perception, as is true for the government router on the
Internet, it is not a seizure. This is a consequence of focusing on the privacy
interest that this author suggests is at the heart of the digital copying problem.
This focus on human acquisition to learn something new has a statutory
parallel in the Wiretap Act. Section 2510(4) defines “intercept” to mean “the
aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral
communication.” 69 The Wiretap Act has a venue provision that only allows a
judge to approve an interception “within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
in which the judge is sitting.” 70 The cases conclude that, even if the connection
to the telephone line occurs in one jurisdiction, the relevant jurisdiction for
determining the location of the interception is the listening post, the place at
which humans perceive the content of the communication. 71 From a physical
perspective, the communication was “seized” at the point of insertion of the
wiretap into the stream of communication. However, the law is concerned with
the acquisition of the content by humans. The location of human perception
determines where the seizure took place. 72
Applying Wiretap Act ideas here means that we do not care about the
Internet router, not because it does not change the path of the packets of data,
but because no human looks at it. Similarly, we are not upset about the police
photographing or writing down the things that they see, because they have
already seen them.

67. Id. at 715.
68. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
70. Id. § 2518(3).
71. See e.g., Dahda v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1491, 1495 (2018); United States v. Rodriguez,
968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399, 402–03 (5th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Jackson, 207 F.3d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 2000).
72. See id.
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III. PRESERVATION UNDER THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) 73 regulates government access to
data that customers store with cloud providers. Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!,
Apple, Twitter, Facebook, and Dropbox are examples of such providers. The
SCA and recent court decisions require the government to obtain a search
warrant whenever it wants to obtain user content in an account. 74 Because so
many criminal cases today involve electronic evidence, good investigators think
about cloud accounts, such as e-mail and social media, at the start of any
investigation. However, at the start of an investigation, law enforcement officers
usually do not have probable cause to obtain a search warrant for an account.
Cloud accounts and their contents are readily deleted. The SCA provides a
solution that prevents destruction of the contents of the account for a limited
time, while simultaneously preserving the privacy of the contents. 75
Section 2703(f) provides that upon receiving governmental entity requests,
a provider must “take all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence
in its possession pending the issuance of a court order or other process.” 76 In
short, the provider must make a copy of the contents of the account. 77 The law
requires the provider to keep this copy for ninety days and allows the
government a single ninety-day extension. 78 Thus, the law gives the government
six months to acquire sufficient evidence for a search warrant. 79 During that
time, the provider holds the copy and is not allowed to give it to the government
without a search warrant. 80 This action has no impact on the customer’s ability
to use the account or to have access to the data it contains. However, preservation
does thwart a customer’s efforts to delete contents, which might be evidence of
the crime under investigation. While the customer can make deletions, the
preserved copy is the record of the account as of the date of preservation. 81 If
the government returns with a search warrant within 180 days, the provider will
have the preserved copy to disclose.
Consider an all too real-world example of this preservation power and the
need for it. During the insurrectionist attack on Congress on January 6, 2021,
many of those who invaded the Capitol carried their cell phones and took

73. The Stored Communications Act is found at 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. The portion that
regulates how the government can obtain data from providers is found at Section 2703.
74. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2230 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f).
76. Id. § 2703(f)(1).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a), (b)(2).
81. See Part V infra for the issues that this may raise.
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photographs and videos. 82 Many participants posted these to online sites, and
the work began immediately to identify the perpetrators.
As someone who conducted investigations in which cloud data was
evidence, this author suggests the logical steps any investigator would take.
After seeing a social media post containing of one of these videos or
photographs, investigators would send a preservation letter to the specific social
media provider to preserve the posting account. That would have happened
hundreds of times in the days following the assault. Investigators would then
work to develop probable cause to search the contents of that account. If a
provider offered electronic communication services (e.g., Facebook messenger),
an investigator would try to find facts to support a warrant to gain access to
communications that related to any planning for the attack, as well as any
communications during or after. The investigator would also look for evidence
of other accounts belonging to this person to develop a full picture of their role
and plans. 83 Communications with others about the assault would provide leads
to follow up, likely resulting in preservation letters for the accounts of those
persons and efforts to search them as well. However, in this author’s experience,
it takes weeks to get a response to a search warrant. 84 Thus, preservation for an
extended period is essential.
IV. IS PRESERVATION UNDER THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT A
SEIZURE?
In the 2010 article, Professor Kerr suggested that the use of preservation
letters under § 2703(f) is a seizure. 85 He has now expanded on it in his new
article, devoted exclusively to this topic. 86 He suggests that when the
government makes the request of the provider, the copying is government action,
and that it is a seizure. 87 Applying his 2010 idea of seizure (copying as freezing)
to the traditional rules about when a private search constitutes government
82. Kat Lonsdor et al., A Timeline of How the Jan. 6 Attack Unfolded—Including Who Said
What and When, NPR (Jan. 5, 2022), https://www.npr.org/2022/01/05/1069977469/a-timeline-ofhow-the-jan-6-attack-unfolded-including-who-said-what-and-when [https://perma.cc/8Y2R-54
TM].
83. The author has not discussed these cases with any prosecutor involved, but an examination
of those charged confirms that social media provided very useful evidence for the government’s
case. See U.S. DEP’T JUST., U.S. ATT’YS OFF. D.C., CAPITOL BREACH CASES, https://www.justice
.gov/usao-dc/capitol-breach-cases (last visited Apr. 4, 2022). As examples, the case against Jared
Hunter Adams relied upon data from Instagram and Google, No. 1:21-CR-212; the case against
Alvear Gonzalez used data from Snapchat, No. 1:21-CR-115; the case against Gina Bisignano used
data from Twitter, No. 1:21-CR-36; and the case against James Bonet used data from Facebook,
No. 1:21-CR-121.
84. Google often took two months or longer to provide a response to a search warrant.
85. Kerr 2010, supra note 2, at 723–24.
86. Kerr 2021, supra note 1.
87. Id. at 702.
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action, he concludes that the copying is a seizure. 88 He then concludes that to
allow a brief seizure (a few hours) the government needs reasonable suspicion,
citing physical world cases involving the detention of objects. 89 When the
government has probable cause, he would permit warrantless copying for twenty
to thirty days. Again, he cites physical world seizure cases for this point. 90
Professor Kerr first proposed this argument in 2010. He has spoken to
organizations of criminal defense attorneys suggesting that they raise this
question, 91 and he has posted a short summary of this argument on the Volokh
Conspiracy. 92 Yet, there are almost no cases on the subject. 93 Defense attorneys
have not taken up his challenge. Prosecutors and providers continue to use the
preservation process. That suggests that most people believe that when the
provider makes a copy, but the government cannot see it until it provides a
search warrant, there is no seizure. According to Professor Kerr, however, this
is a seizure because an agent of the government (the Internet Service Provider
(“ISP”) acting on a government request) has made a copy, and the government
has not seen it before. 94 This author suggests that the preservation letter is like
the Gorshkov case, only on the other side of the looking glass. We do not feel
this is a seizure because the subscriber has not lost access to anything, but unlike
in Gorshkov, the government has not gotten access to anything. Calling this a
seizure seems just as odd as saying that what happened in Gorshkov was not a
seizure.
A.

Even Under a Traditional Definition of Seizure, Preservation Under
§ 2703(f) is not a Seizure

In his new article, Professor Kerr takes his new concept of seizurecopying
to freeze dataand applies standard physical world law to it. 95 Because the ISP
acts at the request of the government, and because the statute requires the ISP to
preserve a copy, this would be considered government action. 96 Thus, he
determines it is a seizure. In the physical world, a warrantless seizure can only
last for a brief time. No cases permit a warrantless seizure of a physical object
for 180 days, so Professor Kerr argues that the preservation process violates the

88. Id. at 711.
89. Id. at 754–55.
90. Id. at 755–57.
91. Kerr 2021, supra note 1, at 705.
92. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and Email Preservation Letters, WASH. POST
(Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/10/28/thefourth-amendment-and-email-preservation-letters/ [https://perma.cc/437G-B82T].
93. Kerr 2021, supra note 1, at 758.
94. Id. at 783.
95. Id. at 757.
96. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989).
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Fourth Amendment. 97 The new article does not make it clear why we should be
open to a new concept of seizure for digital evidence (one that defines seizure
as copying for freezing, but not copying for memory), but at the same time, not
re-examine the collateral issues, such as the time limits for warrantless copying
of items, that should go with such a rethinking.
This Section first suggests that even using physical world thinking, the
preservation is not a seizure even though the acts of the ISP are done at the
government’s request. Further, even using the physical world thinking, the time
periods offered by Professor Kerr do not make sense. Finally, in examining the
preservation letter under the light of the privacy analysis, this author concludes
there is no seizure.
1.

Caselaw Suggests That Preservation is Not a Seizure Under Physical
World Standards

Before turning to the new proposed approach, the author believes that
Professor Kerr is wrong in his assertion that preservation is a seizure, even under
physical world standards. Kerr cites two cases, United States v. Place 98 and
United States v. LaFrance, 99 for the proposition that seizures based upon
reasonable suspicion must be quite brief. In Place, agents stopped Place as he
landed at LaGuardia airport. 100 When he would not consent to the search of his
luggage, they detained it and took it to Kennedy Airport where it was subject to
a dog sniff. 101 It took ninety minutes from the seizure until the dog alerted to the
luggage. Because it was Friday afternoon, the agents held the luggage and
obtained a search warrant on the following Monday. The Court held that ninety
minutes was too long of a seizure. 102 What influenced the Court was not just that
the seizure deprived Place of his possessory interest in his bags, but also holding
his baggage effectively detained him. 103 With the preservation of an account, the
account holder neither loses access to the data nor their freedom of movement.
LaFrance makes an even stronger case for preservation not being a seizure.
LaFrance involved the shipment of drugs by FedEx. 104 The FedEx contract
obligated it to deliver the package to the recipient by noon on the day of
seizure. 105 At 9:03 AM, the police asked FedEx to hold the package; somewhere
97. Kerr 2021, supra note 1, at 754–55.
98. 462 U.S. 696, 715 (1983).
99. 879 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1989).
100. Place, 462 U.S. at 698.
101. Id. at 699.
102. Id. at 709–10.
103. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708–09 (1983) (“Nevertheless, such a seizure can
effectively restrain the person since he is subjected to the possible disruption of his travel plans in
order to remain with his luggage or to arrange for its return.”).
104. United States v. LaFrance, 879 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989).
105. Id. at 3.
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around 9:20 AM, the police requested that FedEx deliver the package to the
police station. 106 It arrived at 12:45 PM; the dog sniff test began at 1:15 PM and
ended by 2:15 PM. 107 The court measured the time of detention from noon, when
the package should have been delivered. 108 In other words, there was no
interference with the defendant’s possessory interest in the package until he was
contractually due to receive it. The time of deprivation was measured from that
point, even though the police had exercised dominion and control over the
package earlier. If this scenario had taken place with an ISP account, the owner
would have access to the account before 9:03 AM, after 9:03 AM, and so on
until such time as the account holder or the provider decided to shut the account
down. With preservation, the ISP meets its contractual obligation to deliver the
data whenever and wherever the user wants it. It is difficult to see how this is a
meaningful interference with the possessory interest in the property.
Changing the facts of LaFrance only slightly makes the result even more
clear. If the police had called FedEx and asked them to hold a package, then they
went to FedEx the same day, wrote down information from the package label,
and told FedEx to continue with the delivery of the package, whether there has
been a seizure depends on whether the delivery of the package was delayed. If
the actions of the agents did not slow the delivery (e.g., it was put on the same
outgoing truck it had been scheduled to be put on and FedEx had delivered the
package at noon), the actions would not be a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.
In United States v. Va Lerie, 109 the police pulled the luggage from the
luggage compartment of a Greyhound bus on which Va Lerie was a passenger.
In rejecting his claim that removing the luggage from the bus constituted a
seizure, the court gave as one of its reasons the fact that there was no basis to
believe that the luggage would not have been put back on the bus in time for its
departure. 110 The court dealt with the three major concerns of seizure, writing,
[R]eversing the district court’s seizure decision, we hold such conduct did not
constitute a seizure, because the removal of the luggage did not (1) delay Va
Lerie’s travel or significantly impact Va Lerie’s freedom of movement, (2) delay
the timely delivery of the checked luggage, or (3) deprive Greyhound of its
custody of the checked luggage. 111

On the second pointdelaying deliverythe court noted that Va Lerie
consented to the search of the luggage after it had been removed from the bus. 112
106. Id.
107. Id. at 3.
108. Id. at 7.
109. United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694, 696 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (the defendant’s
luggage was taken off of a Greyhound bus on which he was traveling).
110. See id. at 707.
111. Id. at 696.
112. Id. at 709–10.
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In rejecting the idea that the police action was a seizure before his consent, the
court wrote, “the NSP’s removal of Va Lerie’s checked luggage from the bus
did not affect the timely delivery of the luggage. No evidence suggests the
luggage would not have been placed back on the bus for transport to its
destination had it not been for the discovery of illegal drugs.” 113
When the ISP makes a copy after receiving a preservation letter, following
the paradigm of Place, LaFrance, and Va Lerie, nothing interferes with the
subscriber’s personal freedom, there is not even a second’s delay in the user’s
access to her data, and the data never leaves the custody of the ISP. If this would
not be a seizure in the physical world, it is difficult to find a rationale that makes
it a seizure in the digital world. Moreover, in the physical world examples, the
government agents had their hands on the luggage and packages. With a
preservation letter, the government does not obtain a copy of the data and cannot
see the data until it produces the necessary legal process, usually a search
warrant. The ISP is forbidden to turn it over without such process. 114
Owner access to the data was also one of the facts that influenced the court
in United States v. Laist. 115 Laist allowed FBI agents to take his computers and
drives and consented to a search. 116 Before the agents took away the devices,
Laist asked if he could copy the files he needed for school. 117 The agents allowed
him to “download whatever he wanted to download,” and Laist “did take off
what he thought he needed at that time.” 118 A few days later, Laist revoked his
consent, but the FBI waited twenty-five days before preparing a search
warrant. 119 The issue was whether the delay in obtaining the warrant violated
the Fourth Amendment. 120 In deciding not to suppress the evidence, the court
gave weight to the fact that Laist had been permitted to copy whatever “he
thought he needed at the time.” 121 The fact that Laist had the data he wanted,
even though he no longer had possession of his device, was an important fact for
the court. 122
In Laist, what happened was clearly a seizurethe defendant did not have
the use of his computers at all. But access to the data was an important factor in
the decision on the question of delay in obtaining the warrant. 123 Consider,
however, that although he was allowed to copy whatever he thought he needed,
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 708.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2702, 2703(a).
702 F.3d 608, 616 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 610–11.
Id. at 611.
Id.
Id. at 611–12.
United States v. Laist, 702 F.3d 608, 612 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 611.
Id. at 616.
Id.
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his choice of what to copy was obviously made under stress. It is not unusual to
think of something one wants that is stored on a computer and to search for it.
This could be the contact information for an old friend, an e-mail one received
three years ago, a document one wrote, or a purchase one made. Which of us
could remember those things when being rushed to copy whatever we needed?
Nevertheless, the court held that having access to what he designated at the time
of the seizure mitigated its impact. Contrast that with the preservation letter. The
customer does not have to make a snap decisionor any decision. All data
remains available during the entire preservation period. Looking for the place
you bought those comfortable shoes four years ago? If it is in your cloud
account, even if it has been preserved at the request of the government, you can
find it. All of this suggests that preservation is not a seizure. 124
2.

Kerr’s Application of Physical World Time Limits is not Justified

As noted above, Professor Kerr adopts physical world time limits to
preservation letters, allowing for a few hours’ detention when based upon
reasonable suspicion and for longer periods (using cases, such as Laist, in which
the government delayed applying for a search warrant as the standard) when
based upon probable cause. 125
Consider the impossibility of meeting these time deadlines in the Capitol
assault cases discussed above. Even a single person incident would result in a
search for multiple online sources, and it may take the review of the contents of
one (provided only weeks after the execution of a search warrant) to get probable
cause to search another. Although inconvenience to the government is not a basis
for disregarding the Fourth Amendment, when one contemplates what seizures
are “reasonable,” practical considerations play an important role.
When turning to the reasons justifying time limits on warrantless seizures of
physical objects, it is clear that none of the concerns creating those limitations
are involved with digital copying. All of the cases express a concern that a
physical world detention deprives the user of the use of the object. When the
object is a digital device, detention deprives them of access to the data. In
luggage cases, such as Place, the seizure also limits the owner’s freedom of

124. As this Article was about to be sent to the printer, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument
that a preservation letter is a seizure. The court focused upon the two factors emphasized in this
Article, writing: “Here, the preservation requests themselves, which applied only retrospectively,
did not meaningfully interfere with Rosenow’s possessory interests in his digital data because they
did not prevent Rosenow from accessing his account. Nor did they provide the government with
access to any of Rosenow’s digital information without further legal process.” United States v.
Rosenow, No. 20-50052, 2022 WL 1233236, at *12 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 2022) (noting additionally
that by agreeing to the terms of service, Rosenow consented to the provider honoring preservation
requests).
125. Id. at 799–800, 804–05.
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movement. 126 If we are going to rethink the doctrine of seizure and apply it to
copying as Professor Kerr does, we must also examine the reasons for the time
limits for warrantless detention. 127 Losing access to a physical object, and in
some cases to the data it contains, has a significant impact on the owner. Thus,
courts have allowed only short periods of warrantless detention.
Even assuming that the preservation of data is a seizure, there is no reason
to port in the time limits of the physical world. The preservation letter has none
of the impacts on the owner that the physical world seizures do. The question
then is whether a 180-day preservation is unreasonable. As discussed above, the
preservation has no impact on the user’s access to the data and does not give the
government access to it either. The status quo is preserved for all parties. Under
such circumstances, the idea of what is reasonable needs reexamination.
Investigations take time. A diligent investigator will pursue many leads:
interviewing witnesses, subpoenaing records, etc. Some businesses are quick to
respond to subpoenas; othersbanks, and Google, in this author’s
experienceare much slower. The congressional decision to allow a maximum
of six months for the government to gather enough facts to justify a search
warrant is a reasonable solution, particularly when the impact on the user is
negligible.
B.

Applying a Privacy Analysis, a Preservation Letter is not a Seizure

Turning to the privacy interest, which is the real concern, the copying has
no impact on the user’s privacy interest. Although the ISP makes a copy of the
data, the ISP already has the data. The user has entrusted the ISP to hold the
data, and the ISP has access to the content. 128 Making an extra copy has no
impact on the user’s privacy interest. No one has been added to the list of those
who can see the data. Preservation has no impact on the real concern with data
copyingprivacy. The lack of any impact on privacy suggests that preservation
126. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708–09 (1983).
127. Kerr 2021, supra note 1, at 757.
128. For example, Google’s terms of service make clear that they can look at a user’s content.
See Terms of Service, GOOGLE (Jan. 5, 2022), https://policies.google.com/terms?hl=en-US
[https://perma.cc/K6EP-WTKA] (after making clear that a user keeps any intellectual property
rights in data stored with Google, the terms of service say, “This license doesn’t affect your privacy
rights—it’s only about your intellectual property rights[.]”). Facebook’s terms of service are
similar. See Terms of Service, FACEBOOK (Jan. 4, 2022), https://www.facebook.com/terms.php
[https://perma.cc/S2PV-CWLC] (“Specifically, when you share, post, or upload content that is
covered by intellectual property rights on or in connection with our Products, you grant us a nonexclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, and worldwide license to host, use, distribute,
modify, run, copy, publicly perform or display, translate, and create derivative works of your
content (consistent with your privacy and application settings).”). Dropbox encrypts stored data,
but it controls the encryption keys. See How Dropbox Keeps Your Files Secure, DROPBOX,
https://help.dropbox.com/accounts-billing/security/how-security-works (last visited on Mar. 31,
2022).
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is not a seizure. The fact that the copy was made at the request of the government
does not change anything. The provider always makes backup copies of its data,
which will include the customer’s account. Moreover, unlike the case in which
a government agent copies a hard drive, the government has no access to the
copy. There is no impairment of the privacy interest until the government
produces a warrant. Without a warrant, this tree falling in the forest makes no
sound. 129
V. THE PROBLEM OF DELETED DATA
The only problem that remains is the impact of preservation of data, which
the customer deletes after the preservation but before the execution of the search
warrant. As noted in Part III, the preservation process of § 2703(f) is designed
to thwart evidence destruction. 130 Consider a case in which the government
sends a preservation letter to Dropbox on day one. On day thirty, the user deletes
a document. On day 170, the government serves a search warrant for the account
on Dropbox. If Dropbox produces the copy it made on day one, it will produce
the deleted file. Dropbox will produce the document that the user deleted
because it has made the preservation copy. If there had been no preservation, the
Dropbox would not be able produce it.
Professor Kerr recognizes that this is the only scenario in which suppression
would be a possible remedy, for he notes that the inevitable discovery doctrine
would protect any items that were not deleted from suppression. 131
This Part examines the questions raised by an ISP’s production of an item
that would not have been present on the day of execution of the warrant were it
not for the preservation, by first looking at the problem using Professor Kerr’s
physical world seizure analysisthat copying is a seizure, and then assessing
the problem from the privacy perspective. For many providers, this will not be
an issue. Gmail, for example, often archives deleted e-mails, depending on the
user’s settings. After choosing to delete a message, one must then affirmatively
act to delete the message from the archive and even then, Gmail will hold it for
129. The warrant requirement to get access to preserved data distinguishes such data from the
copying in Gorshkov, where the government had immediate access to the data. Although it chose
not to search the data until it obtained a warrant, there was always a risk that some government
agent would look at it. There is no such risk with data copied pursuant to a preservation letter. See
United States v. Gorshkov, No. CR00-550C, 2001 WL 1024026 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001).
130. See supra Part III.
131. Kerr 2021, supra note 1, at 807: “Applying the inevitable discovery exception leads to a
simple outcome: The exclusionary rule applies to the preservation copy but not to the warrant copy.
If the preservation copy is the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure, it should not have existed, and it
cannot be used. But the warrant copy exists independently of preservation, and therefore it exists
independently of the constitutional violation. The government can ensure that it is only using
‘information [that] ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means by using
only the warrant copy.’”
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thirty days, in case the user reconsiders. 132 Otherwise, e-mail remains in the
archive forever. Dropbox will hold a deleted file for thirty days in case the
customer reconsiders. 133
A.

Employing the Physical World Seizure Analysis

Professor Kerr’s reliance upon physical world seizure analysis prompts an
examination of the attempted deletion under that paradigm. The act of deletion
changes the subscriber’s legal interest in the data deleted. Until that moment, the
customer owned the data, and the ISP held it as a bailee; the government could
not search it without a warrant. 134 But at the moment of deletion, the customer
now abandons the property and gives it to the ISP to get rid of. In a physical
world scenario, consider a murderer who wants to get rid of the murder weapon,
so he gives it to a friend to throw into the river. To make this more analogous to
the ISP situation, imagine that the defendant was hiding, so the police went to
all his friends and relatives and specifically requested that if the defendant sent
anything to them, they should call the police and turn it over. Weeks later, the
police return to the friend, who reveals that the defendant sent him a package
and asked him to destroy the contents. By delivering the package to someone
else to destroy it, the defendant has abandoned it and given any Fourth
Amendment rights solely to the recipient.
Deleting a file held by an ISP is the digital equivalent of throwing a physical
object away. 135 In the physical world, that constitutes abandonment. 136 Merely
putting a physical item in the trash is not only expressing a lack of privacy
expectation in it, but also abandoning the property. 137 The test for abandonment
132. See Control Email and Chat Message Storage, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/a
/answer/151128?hl=en&ref_topic=9973341 [https://perma.cc/U9NL-FHUB] (last visited Jan. 23,
2022).
133. See Deleted File Recovery and Version History, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/fea
tures/cloud-storage/file-recovery-and-history [https://perma.cc/T5YC-77HN] (last visited Dec. 27,
2020).
134. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 735 (1877) (mail); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d
266, 285 (6th Cir. 2010) (e-mail).
135. Because the ISP holds the file, there is a relinquishment of ownership. This is different
from the case of a person who possesses the data on her own computer and deletes the file. In that
situation, the person retains custody of the medium that holds the now-deleted file and has not
abandoned the property. United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 1999).
136. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991).
137. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–40 (1988); United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d
1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir. 1992) (throwing
away is abandonment; shredding document before throwing it away does not restore the expectation
of privacy); United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981) (decided before
Greenwood). Scott shows the distinction between the possessory and privacy interests. Throwing
away the document abandons the possessory interest. Shredding was a subjective expression of the
privacy interest, but one which is not reasonable. Professor Kerr cited Scott for the proposition that
shredding does not create an expectation of privacy in his article arguing that encryption does not
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in the physical world is expressed in various ways all looking to whether the
person voluntarily discarded the property or relinquished his interest in it. 138 A
person who deletes a file in cloud storage or in an e-mail account is clearly
voluntarily discarding it. The fact that the ISP holds onto it is the same risk run
by the murderer who gives the weapon to a friend to destroy. The main
difference, however, is that with the murder weapon, the police can just ask the
friend for it. With the deleted file, law enforcement must produce a search
warrant to get it. 139 The warrant requirement is not a constitutional requirement
with abandonment, but it is a statutory requirement in the case of digital evidence
in cloud storage.
B.

The Privacy Analysis

When a person opts to store a file online, as opposed to on a home computer,
they make a choice to surrender a part of their privacy in the file. They make the
same choice when choosing to send an e-mail or online message, rather than a
letter. 140 In both cases, the file or message is entrusted to a bailee. Nothing about
this surrender of privacy changes when they instruct the provider to delete the
file. The person’s privacy interest in the file remains the same. As noted
above, 141 making a preservation copy does not change that. The act of entrusting
reflects the choice that the provider will keep a copy. The preservation copy does
not have any impact on that because no one can see the preservation copy that
could not see the data before. The loss of privacy remains constant. The risk that
the provider might keep a copy indefinitely was accepted by the user at the time
they uploaded the file or sent the message. The person does not lose any
constitutional right of privacy until the government obtains access. That is
possible only when the government obtains a search warrant. 142

create an expectation of privacy. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can
Encryption Create A “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?”, 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 513 (2001).
138. See e.g., Bond v. United States, 77 F.3d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d 1510, 1522 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539,
1546 (11th Cir. 1987) (the critical inquiry is “whether the person prejudiced by the search . . .
voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property in question
so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of
the search.”); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847, 855 (1st Cir. 1982).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
140. The choice made by sending a letter or an e-mail involves surrendering the privacy interest
in those documents to the recipient as well.
141. See supra Part V.A.
142. As noted supra note 129, the warrant requirement makes the preservation letter situation
different from what occurred in Gorshkov.
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C. There is No “Right to Delete”
Professor Kerr’s concerns are based upon a “right to delete,” 143 for he
concludes that only items produced by an ISP that the user sought to delete after
the preservation letter should be suppressed. 144 There are those who assert,
forthrightly, that there is a right to delete and that copying interferes with that
right. 145 This idea seems unique to digital information. No one has the right to
destroy physical evidence, and no one suggests that anyone should have such a
right. We have obstruction crimes to deal with destruction of physical evidence.
There are many statutes that require businesses to keep records for inspection. 146
Such laws go beyond prohibiting destruction and require the creation of
evidence. If there is to be such a right to delete for digital evidence, there needs
to be something special about digital evidence that distinguishes it from physical
evidence. However most digital evidence consists of things such as documents,
photographs, videos, etc. All of these have physical world counterparts, and the
obstruction statutes bar the destruction of this kind of physical evidence. There
is no rational basis to distinguish the destruction of the digital counterparts of
these physical objects.
In the physical world, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected such a right.
In Segura v. United States, the Court wrote, “the essence of the dissent is that
there is some ‘constitutional right’ to destroy evidence. This concept defies both
logic and common sense.” 147 Preservation of evidence is one of the three reasons
justifying the government’s right to make a search incident to arrest. 148 It is also
the rationale permitting temporary seizures under exigent circumstances. 149
Moreover, while the criminal obstruction statutes are not constitutional in
nature, 150 they do reflect a judgment about what society recognizes as

143. Kerr 2021, supra note 1, at 765 (“If § 2703(f) covers the contents of communications,
however, the preservation authority becomes a means of ensuring government access to messages
that users themselves might otherwise opt to destroy.”). See also id. at 34 (“Preservation eliminates
that control. A person who wants to delete a private message will think he can delete it. A person
who wants to delete his entire account will think it is gone. But when contents are preserved, users
can’t do that.”).
144. Id. at 58.
145. See generally Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment Right to Delete, 119 HARV. L. REV. F.
10 (2005).
146. For example, insured banks are required to keep such records as the Secretary of the
Treasury, or the Federal Reserve Board may require. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b.
147. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 816 (1984).
148. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763
(1969).
149. See generally Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
150. There are several federal statutes that specifically prohibit the altering or destruction of
documents. See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (concealing or destroying documentary material in an
antitrust civil investigative demand). Id. § 1519 (destroying or concealing records or documents to
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reasonable. For example, Section 1519 of Title 18, U.S. Code, makes destruction
or alteration of records a crime, if it is done to “influence” a federal investigation,
even if no such investigation is occurring. 151 The crime is destruction in
contemplation that such an investigation might come into being. The statute of
limitations for obstruction offenses is five years, 152 suggesting that the
government’s right to obtain evidence is superior to any right to delete for at
least five years. The statute reflects a societal judgment that we do not want
people deleting files that might turn out to be useful in a criminal prosecution. 153
The five-year statute of limitations for obstruction crimes also suggests that the
180-day preservation period is reasonable. If there is a right to delete, then the
obstruction statutes would be unconstitutional.
Once again, the assault on the Capitol on January 6, 2021, provides a good
example of why we do not want people deleting evidence. Many of the people
who entered the Capitol building made videos and photographs of their actions.
They posted them to social media sites. If there were a right to delete, it would
permit these people to destroy all that evidence to avoid the consequences of
their actions. There should be little doubt that after some of those who entered
the Capitol learned that others were being arrested based upon their social media
postings, they would have tried to delete the images that they had posted. Only
preservation letters will impede their success.
However, one could ask the following question applying the preservation
letter concept to the physical world: “Could the government issue a preservation
letter to an individual to preserve physical evidence?” Although this scenario is
unlikely, it is worth noting that the obstruction statutes do just that. A physical
world preservation letter would be an improvement over these obstruction
statutes for it would provide better notice to a person of the danger of
destruction. The general rule is that “ignorance of the law is no excuse.” 154 A
person does not have to know that it is a crime to destroy evidence to be found
guilty. 155 A preservation letter would have the value of informing the person of
this danger.

impede, obstruct, or influence and investigation within the jurisdiction of any department of the
United States or under Title 11 [Bankruptcy], “or in contemplation of any such matter or case.”).
151. 18 U.S.C. § 1519
152. Id. § 3282.
153. Although there is no right to delete as such, the government’s interest clearly expires after
the statute of limitations for any underlying crime is gone. After the statute of limitations has run,
the government has no legitimate interest in retention of the data.
154. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 196 (1998).
155. United States v. McCoy, 2016 WL 1248743, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 2016) (applying
principle to 18 U.S.C. § 1519).
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It is true that the coverage of a preservation letter is broader than that of an
obstruction statute or even a litigation hold order. 156 Those types of preservation
are limited to matters relevant to some investigation or litigation. A statutory
preservation letter to an ISP applies to everything held by the ISP in the account.
There are good reasons, however, for allowing a different scope for preservation
letters. First, a preservation letter to the ISP is not a general restriction on the
subscriber from destroying anything in the world, regardless of relevance. It is a
limited order to the ISP that only applies to the files that the subscriber has
entrusted to the ISP. Thus, it is much more narrowly focused. Second, while a
preservation letter to a person or even a litigation hold order permits that person
to make judgments about what matters are relevant to the litigation or
investigation, an ISP is not in a position to do that. It has little or no idea about
the nature of the investigation, and it has no people trained to conduct searches
to find evidence that would be relevant to the investigation it does not know
about. ISPs do not want to participate in the search process. Thus, for example,
Google has objected to a search warrant that required it to look through an email account for child exploitation material because it was “not competent to
perform such an analysis and requiring it to do so [was] unfair and unduly
burdensome.” 157 Finally, the order presents a minimal burden on the ISP, which
is in the business of keeping data. Under such circumstances an order that
preserves only those things in the ISP account, and not everything a person owns
(as a preservation letter to a person or a litigation hold order would do), for a
short time, is a reasonable solution. It only preserves things that the ISP holds
and recognizes the inability of the ISP to make the necessary judgments about
what matters would be relevant.
CONCLUSION
Digital is different. Although to some this is just a slogan, it is a good
reminder that the move from the physical world to the digital requires rethinking
of some of our legal principles. Some rules of the physical world do not translate
well in the digital environment. Thus, the physical world law of search incident
to arrest had to change to recognize that the search of a package of cigarettes is
different from the search of a cell phone. 158 On the other hand, there was no need
for new law to decide what is a threat, when it is posted on Facebook, rather than
in a letter or made orally. 159 Professor Kerr has been a leader in re-examining
the law of search and seizure when applied to the digital world. His 2010 article
156. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (a litigation hold order arises out of the discovery
obligations imposed on civil litigants); Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 16 (1948) (court orders can
be state action).
157. In re Search of Google Email Accounts, 99 F. Supp. 3d 992, 995 (D. Alaska 2015).
158. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 375 (2014).
159. Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 745 (2015).
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was an effort to bring the physical world definition of seizure into the digital
world. His position has the common law virtue of keeping what we have and
trying to interpret and modify it in light of new facts. However, to do so he had
to create two “fudge factors”ad hoc rules to render certain acts of copying not
seizures. It was not that taking photos of a search scene or the use of government
routers on the Internet did not fit the definition of seizure; it was that calling
them seizures felt ludicrous. Creating ad hoc exceptions does not make for a
consistent body of law.
We need to rethink what a seizure in the digital world is by examining the
true concerns about digital copying. What concerns us is not the possessory
interest in the data, but the privacy interest. Granted, this is a radical shift in the
concept of seizure. It unmoors the definition from the physical world. However,
that is a consequence of the non-rivalrous nature of data. This author suggests
that we will do better in dealing with the problem of digital seizures if we
recognize that we are concerned about privacy and create a body of law
considering that. In the problem at hand, preservation letters, a focus on privacy
addresses the true concerns. That focus also explains that, although a writer as
influential as Professor Kerr has advanced the idea that preservation letters are
seizures for more than a decade, few defense lawyers have challenged them,
prosecutors continue to use them, and ISPs continue to honor them. The fact that
the user loses neither access to their data, nor their privacy interest in the data,
shows that there are no true Fourth Amendment implications in this procedure.
When copying immediately invades privacy, we should consider that to be a
seizure. However, when copying does not invade privacy, we ought not call it a
seizure.
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